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Abstract-; Federal Supplemental Compensation {FSC) was the program 
that temporarily extended the duration of Unemployment Insurance 
(UI) benefits by 8 to 14 weeks during 1982-1984. This paper 
examines whether and to what degree the extension of benefits 
under FSC increased the expected length of UI recipients' jobless 
spells. The estimates are derived from a large Ul-administrative 
data base that spans the expiration of FSC and allows one to 
observe whether and (approximately) when a worker actually 
returned to work. Previous studies of the effects of extended 
benefits have had to make assumptions about UI recipients' return 
to work that appear to yield downward-biased estimates of the 
effect of extended benefits on expected jobless duration. The 
estimates presented here suggest that an .additional week of 
benefit eligibility increases a UI recipient's expected spell of 
joblessness by nearly one week. Moreover, the estimates suggest 
that claimants who exhausted their regular UI benefits and were 
ineligible for an additional 12 weeks of FSC were more than six 
times as likely to return to work as claimants who exhausted their 
regular benefits but were eligible for FSC. Hence, the findings 
offer striking evidence that workers tend to find jobs just as 
their UI benefits expire.
Potential Duration of Unemployment Benefits and
the Duration of Joblessness
Stephen A. Woodbury
Since the mid-1970s, the most-researched question about the 
Unemployment Insurance <UI) system has been whether and to what 
degree higher weekly Ul-benefit amounts lengthen UI recipients' 
jobless spells. But an equally important and under-researched 
question is how the potential duration of those benefits 
influences the length of jobless spells. The latter question is 
important for two reasons. First, since the 1950s, a variety of 
extended Ul-benefit programs have been legislated at the federal 
level, making the potential duration of UI benefits a highly 
variable aspect of the UI system. Second, as will become clear, 
econometric problems make far more tenuous any inference about the 
influence of Ul-benefit extensions on the expected length of UI 
recipients' jobless spells.
This paper explores the effects of the most recent Ul-benefit 
extension program, the Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC) 
program, which temporarily extended the duration of Unemployment 
Insurance <UI) benefits by 8 to 14 weeks during 1982-1984. 
Estimates of how FSC influenced the length of UI recipients' 
expected jobless spells are derived from a large UI administrative 
data base that was gathered just before and just after the 
expiration of FSC in late 1984. These data offer two advantages 
over the administrative data used in most existing studies of the 
effects of potential benefit duration on expected jobless
duration. First, because the data were gathered just before and 
after the expiration of the FSC program, eligibility for FSC 
depends (for most of the sample) only on the timing of a worker's 
initial claim for UI benefits, and is independent of each worker's 
characteristics and earnings history. Second, the data allow one 
to observe whether and (approximately) when a worker actually 
returned to work. The ability to observe actual return-to-work 
allows one to overcome what appears to be the most important 
econometric problem involved in appraising the effects of extended 
benefits on expected jobless duration that of correctly 
specifying whether an observed spell of joblessness is complete or 
censored.
The next section offers some background both historical and 
economic on extended benefits. Section II characterizes the 
problems of measurement that appear to have hampered researchers 
in their efforts to obtain unbiased estimates of the influence of 
potential benefit duration on the expected length of UI 
recipients' jobless spells. That section also treats the data 
used in this study and describes how they can yield improved 
estimates of the effects of extended benefits. Section III 
develops and presents estimates of several models that allow one 
to infer the effects of extended benefits. Included are a simple 
linear duration model, a parametric jobless duration model that 
accounts for censoring of the dependent variable and non-normality 
of the error term, and a semi-parametric model of the conditional 
probability (or hazard) of returning to work. A final section 
summarizes the findings of the paper.
I. Potential UI Benefit Duration and Extended Benefits 
A. Institutional and Policy Background
At the outset of the U.S. Unemployment Insurance program in 
1936, the decision was made to limit benefit duration, mainly on
!
the grounds that benefits that could not be financed out of 
anticipated contributions should not be provided (Haber and Murray 
1966, pp. 111-113). That decision, which today is so widely 
accepted that it is taken for granted, has led to a variety of 
policy questions and economic issues. For example, on what 
grounds is benefit duration to be limited, and what should the 
limit be? Should potential duration of regular benefits be 
uniform for all workers, or vary with a worker's employment 
history? Should extended benefits be made available to workers 
who exhaust their regular benefits during economic downturns? If 
so, how should the duration of the extended benefits be set? 
Should extended benefits be discretionary that is, made available 
when Congress and the Administration see a need or triggered 
automatically by prespecified macroeconomic conditions? If an 
automatic trigger is chosen, how should the prespecified 
conditions be set?
Today, limited l-£BEFfce~a benefit duration is accepted as a 
premise of the UI system both for financial reasons <as in 1936) 
and because it is widely believed that to make available benefits 
of unlimited duration would weaken incentives to seek employment.
This latter point that longer potential benefit duration leads to 
longer spells of joblessness is now the central policy issue in 
regard to the duration of benefits for the obvious reason that 
answers to the six questions posed above depend on it.
Even though limited benefit duration is accepted as a premise 
of the UI system, it has become clear in the last 20 years that 
the UI system is expected to respond to severe cyclical downturns 
by extending benefits for workers who have exhausted their regular 
benefits. Indeed, Murray (1974) has stated this as a premise of 
the UI system, and bot/h Might (1975) and Corson and Nicholson 
(1982) have shown how extending benefits during a recession can 
alleviate hardship and reduce exhaustion rates to levels as low as 
would occur under good economic conditions.
The initial rationale for extended benefits was that as labor 
market conditions worsen during a recession, jobless spells 
lengthen as it becomes more difficult to find a job. This basic 
rationale was undermined during the 1970s by research showing that 
most jobless spells are of short duration, even those spells 
experienced during a recession (Perry 1972; Hall 1972). Indeed, 
recent evidence reported by Dynarski and Sheffrin (1987) suggests 
that the average duration of a jobless spell varies little over 
the business cycle. Such findings call into question the 
soundness of extending benefits during cyclical downturns.
Three types of findings have mitigated the effects of the 
arguments against extending benefits during downturns. First, 
various studies of workers who have exhausted their UI benefits 
(Mathematical Policy Research 1976; see Murray 1974 and Hamerraesh
1977 for reviews of the earlier exhaustee studies) suggest that 
exhaustees are strongly attached to the labor force, and are not 
workers who would have dropped out of the labor force had they 
been ineligible for benefits. Second, the turnover view of the 
labor market that most jobless spells are short seems to have 
neglected the existence of a relatively small group of workers who 
experience very long unemployment spells (Akerlof and Main 1980; 
Clark and Summers 1979). Third, and most important, the most 
recent studies of workers' responses to extended benefits suggest 
that extending the potential duration of UI benefits does not 
appreciably increase the expected duration of jobless spells (see 
in particular Moffitt 1985a, 1985b). If these latter findings are 
accepted, then there can be little objection to extending UI 
benefits during cyclical downturns.
B. Theoretical Issues
Most estimates of the effects of both benefit duration and 
benefit amounts on the duration of joblessness have been based on 
one or another model of job search (see Mortensen 1986). These 
models provide a theoretical link between the duration of 
joblessness, on the one hand, and job-search intensity, individual 
characteristics, and labor market conditions, on the other. It is
useful to review a general job-search model as a prelude to the
i 
empirical work.
1. Other models also provide possible bases for empirical work 
on unemployment duration. Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) have used 
the familiar Income-leisure model of labor supply, and Davidson
Let- T denote the week in which a UI recipient returns to 
work, and let P^ denote the probability that a UI recipient 
returns to work in week t, given that she has not already returned 
to work by then; that is, P. = Pr[T=t I T2.t] . Then we can express 
P. as the product of (a) the probability of receiving a job offer 
in week t and (b) the probability of accepting that job offer, 
given that an offer has been made. The probability of receiving 
an job offer in week t (J,) depends on the intensity of the
V
worker's job search (i) and a vector of characteristics of the 
worker that determine the demand for the worker's labor (c); that 
is, J, = J. (i,c). The probability of offer acceptance (A. )
\f W V
depends on whether "the offered wage <w ) equals or exceeds the
worker's reservation wage (wr ); t-hat is, A, = Pr[w >_wr |J, ].
Hence, we can express ^/he probability of finding reemployment
during week t <given that reemployment has not already occurred)
as:
U> Pt = Jt <i,c) At .
We have defined P. in discrete time above. In the limit, as 
the time interval over which reemployment is measured approaches
zero, P, becomes an instantaneous rate of reemployment known as a \/
hazard rate, h(t). The hazard rate is linked to unemployment 
duration in the following way. If t has cumulative distribution 
F(t), and frequency distribution f(t), then h<t) = f(t)/[l - F(t)] 
= f(t)/S(t), where S(t) is the so-called survivor function, or the 
probability of being unemployed to time t (Lancaster 1979). We 
can also express the survivor function as dependent on the hazard:
and Woodbury <1989) have used a job-matching model.
S(t) = f(t)/h(t). Thus, the hazard rate is inversely related to 
the survival probability, and any factor that increases the hazard 
rate should decrease expected unemployment duration. For example, 
equation <1) highlights the fact that longer spells of joblessness 
can result from less-intense job search, from individual 
characteristics (c) that imply lower demand for a worker's 
services, or from a lower probability of job-offer acceptance. 
From the point of view of the present work, the probability of 
offer acceptance, A^ r and the intensity of job search, i, are 
central, depending as they do on the generosity and duration of UI 
benefits.
II. Problems of Data and Inference
The data used here come from the administrative records of 
the State of Illinois Unemployment Insurance system, and were 
gathered as part of the Illinois UI Bonus experiment (see Woodbury 
and Spiegelman 1987, pp. 514-518, for a fuller description). The 
workers examined here are the 2,162 Ul-eligible male claimants who 
were assigned to the control group of the experiment.
The Illinois data are typical of the data used in past 
studies of the effects of extended benefits on the duration of 
unemployment because they are administrative data that is, data 
gathered and maintained by agencies responsible for administering 
the UI program. Indeed, it would make little sense to use any 
other type of data to address this issue, because only in
8administrative data is there accurate information on a claimant's 
eligibility for UI and extended benefits.
But the Illinois data have three features that make them 
unique among UI administrative data, and especially well suited to 
an examination of the influence of potential benefit duration on 
expected jobless duration. First, they span the expiration of the 
FSC program at the end of 1984. Consequently, they permit one to 
compare the jobless spells of workers who were actually eligible 
to FSC with the spells of workers who would have been eligible if 
they had become unemployed and .filed for benefits only weeks 
earlier. In other available data sets, eligibility for extended 
benefits often depends on an individual's work history (base 
period earnings or weeks of employment prior to layoff). 
Inferences about the independent contribution of potential benefit 
duration to the length of a jobless spell should be less tenuous 
with the Illinois data than in data where potential duration is 
correlated with work history.
Second, the Illinois data include both earnings history data 
and a return to work indicator, which permit one to make an
accurate classification of jobless spells as complete or
2 
censored. Earlier researchers have frequently had to make what
appear to be erroneous assumptions about whether a spell of 
insured unemployment represents a complete or censored spell of
2. Because these are administrative data, there is no way of 
distinguishing unemployment from out-of-labor-force status for 
workers who have no earnings after the spell of insured 
unemployment ends. Accordingly, we focus on the duration of 
joblessness (meaning either unemployment or out-of-labor force 
status), and with the probability of return to work.
joblessness. A more complete discussion of this issue and its 
consequences follows.
A. Censoring Problems
Most analyses of the effects on jobless duration of potential
benefit duration and benefit amounts have used basic benefits data
t 
from UI administrative files. These data are extremely rich: For
example, in the Illinois data, the so-called Benefits Information 
System contains demographic data on claimants, the dates of their 
UI claims, and the amount and timing of benefits received.
But basic benefits data from UI administrative files are 
usually deficient in that they exclude any information on the 
subsequent earnings of claimants. Hence, they fail to offer data 
on actual spells of unemployment. Rather, they indicate only the 
duration of insured unemployment experienced by a claimant.
In the Illinois data, this deficiency can be partly overcome 
by two additional pieces of data. The first is a return-to-work 
indicator that was constructed with the cooperation of Illinois 
Department of Employment Security personnel during and after the 
experiment that generated the data. The second is a separate 
administrative data base known as Wage Records, which stores 
information on the earnings history of workers both before and 
after their spell of insured unemployment. By matching each 
claimant's wage record to his or her benefits data, it is possible 
to determine whether a spell of insured unemployment was followed 
by a period of earnings. If the observed spell of insured
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unemployment was followed by a period of earnings, and if the 
return-to-work indicator was positive, then we can infer that the 
insured spell and the actual spell of joblessness were the same. 
On the other hand, if the insured spell was not followed by a 
spell of earnings, the insured spell must be considered a censored 
or truncated measure of the actual spell of joblessness.
It is rare for administrative data to have a return-to-work 
indicator or Wage Records matched to the benefits data, as in the 
Illinois data. As a result, existing research using 
administrative data has necessasrily taken a different approach to 
drawing inferences about actual spells of joblessness from 
observations on insured unemployment spells. First, because the 
number of weeks of unemployment that can be observed in 
administrative data is limited by the potential duration of UI 
benefits, it has been assumed that any spell of insured 
unemployment that is at the maximum potential is an incomplete 
spell. For example, a worker eligible for 26 weeks of state 
regular benefits who is observed receiving 26 weeks of UI benefits 
would be considered to have had a jobless spell of greater than 26 
weeks. Second, and conversely, a workers eligible for 26 weeks of 
benefits who is observed receiving less than 26 weeks of UI 
benefits would be considered to have had a jobless spell of 
exactly the observed length.
Neither of these assumptions is necessarily correct, as can 
be seen in Table 1, which shows four cases, labeled A through D. 
Cases A and B are those of workers who received the maximum 
potential weeks of UI benefits that is, exhausted their benefits.
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It is possible for such workers to return to work immediately 
after receiving their last benefit payment (Case A), or to 
continue to be out of covered employment (Case B, which implies 
either continuing to seek employment or dropping out of the labor 
force after receiving the last benefit payment). 3 ip^ e usuai
assumption is that all workers who exhaust benefits continue 
without covered employment, as in Case B. But the right-most 
column of Table 1 shows that this assumption is incorrect for 
nearly 40 percent of the men in the control group of the Illinois 
UI experiment who exhausted their benefits. That/ is, the data 
show  bhat 283 of the 717 men who exhausted their benefits returned 
t/o work immediately (or very shortly) after receiving their last 
benefit payment.
Likewise, it is possible to misclassify a worker who did not 
exhaust his or her benefits. Cases C and D in Table 1 are those 
of workers who received fewer than the potential weeks of benefit 
payments. Again, the usual assumption is that all such workers 
returned to work immediately after they stopped receiving 
benefits, as in Case C. But the right most column shows that 405 
{or 28 percent) of the 1,445 men who ended their benefits before
4
exhausting did not return to covered employment.
3. Obtaining uncovered (usually underground) employment and 
moving out of state are additional possibilities.
4. Most likely, these men either dropped out of the labor force 
or took uncovered employment, although it is possible that they 
stopped participating in UI and continued to seek employment. 
There is no way of distinguishing these possibilities in the 
administrative data.
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B. Censoring and Inference
Estimating the effects of extended UI benefits on expected 
unemployment duration offers a fine example of how censored data 
can interfere with statistical inference. Because the Federal 
Supplemental Compensation program expired about half-way into the 
enrollment period of the Illinois experiment, men in the control 
group of the Illinois experiment can be divided into four 
categories! (a) those who were eligible for FSC because they met 
the monetary eligibility criteria for FSC and filed their 
initial UI claim while FSC was still in effect; <b) those who were 
monetarily eligible for FSC, but claimed benefits too late to 
actually receive FSC; (c) those who were monetarily ineligible for 
benefits, but filed their initial claim before FSC expired; and 
<d) those who were monetarily ineligible for benefits, and filed 
their initial claim after FSC expired.
Table 2 shows the mean insured unemployment duration for each 
of these four groups. What we appear to have is a situation in 
which the expiration of FSC gives us a natural experiment. The 
mean unemployment duration of workers eligible for FSC (21.4 
weeks) can be compared with the mean unemployment duration of 
workers monetarily eligible but temporally ineligible because they 
filed after FSC expired (17.3 weeks). As a quasi-control, the 
mean unemployment duration of workers who were monetarily
5. The monetary eligibility criteria for FSC were somewhat more 
stringent than for state regular benefits. That is, not all UI 
claimants who were monetarily eligible for state regular benefits 
were also monetarily eligible for FSC.
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rneligible but who filed for benefits while FSC was still in 
effect (1G.5 weeks) can be compared with the mean unemployment 
duration of workers who were neither monetarily nor temporally 
eligible (20.1 weeks).
The two comparisons are shown in the bottom row of Table 2 
(labeled "Difference"). The difference between the two groups of
monetarily eligible workers, 3.5 weeks, suggests that FSC
j prolonged unemployment spells significantly. Moreover, the
difference between the two groups of monetarily ineligible 
workers, -3.5 (with a large standard error), suggests that there 
was no underlying macroeconomic or other reason for expecting 
unemployment spells to be longer after the expiration of FSC. The 
conclusion would seem to be that workers eligible for FSC tended 
to take over three weeks longer to return to work than did workers 
who were not eligible for FSC.
Such an inference would clearly be wrong, though, because it 
is impossible to observe more than 26 weeks of unemployment among 
workers ineligible for FSC, whereas we can observe up to 38 weeks 
of unemployment among workers eligible for FSC. The truncation or 
censoring of unemployment spells at the maximum potential duration 
leads to a situation in which the two group means cannot be 
compared. To take Moffitt's (1985a) extreme example, every worker 
in each of the two groups might have an actual spell of 
joblessness of 30 weeks, but we would observe an average of 26 
weeks for the first group (because the data are censored at 26 
weeks) and 30 weeks for the second (because censoring occurs only 
at 38 weeks). It may still be, of course, that FSC tended to
14
lengthen jobless spells, but the data in Table 2 cannot be used to 
make such an inference.
In the presence of censoring, quasi-experimental comparisons 
like those presented in Table 2 fail to yield reliable estimates 
of the effects of extended benefits on jobless duration. Hence, 
other methods of inference must be sought. It is convenient that 
a variety of methods have been developed for handling censored
i
duration data methods that allow one to make inferences about 
actual spells of joblessness from spells of insured unemployment 
(see the recent review by Kiefer 1988). Some of these methods are 
applied in parts B and C of the next section.
III. Models of Unemployment Duration and Reemployment Hazard
Estimates of how potential benefit duration affects the 
expected duration of joblessness have progressed through three 
stages. In this section, the approach represented by each of 
these stages is outlined, and estimated results of models based on 
each approach are presented.
A. A Linear Model of Insured Unemployment Duration
The earliest empirical work on the effects of potential 
duration on expected jobless duration took the straightforward 
approach of regressing the duration in weeks of insured 
unemployment (D) on appropriate explanatory variables (x-
x ^), including measures of the replacement, ratio and potential
duration of benefits:
(2) D = aQ + a 1 x 1 + ... + ^Kx K + u f
where u is assumed to be a normally distributed disturbance term.
The coefficients of x. through x^ provide an estimate of the
relationship between the explanatory variables on weeks of insured
unemployment. Studies that took this approach include Ehrenberg
and Oaxaca (1976), and Holen (1976), among others.
Column (2) of Table 3 displays the results of such a model 
applied to the Illinois control-group men. The results are in 
keeping with the simple comparison of means shown in Table 2, in 
that the coefficient of the FSC eligibility variable suggests that 
the availability of FSC increased the expected length of jobless 
spells by over three weeks.
Note that a variety of control variables, which are of 
secondary importance for present purposes, have also been 
included in the model: age, ethnicity, the number of employers 
that the claimant worked for in the base period, base period 
earnings, the number of referrals received by the claimant from 
the Job Service, whether a dependents' allowance was received, the 
weekly UI benefit amount, and the conditions of the labor market 
in which the claimant was searching for work.
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B. Parametric Models of Time to Reemployment
It is now well-known, however, that the assumption that u in 
equation (2) is normal is untenable, and that application of 
Ordinary Least Squares <OLS) to equation <2) will produce biased 
coefficient estimates. There are two reasons for this. First, as 
already discussed, D is a censored measure of actual jobless 
duration, since each worker is eligible for a specified maximum 
number of weeks of benefits. As a result, the distribution of D 
is truncated at the maximum benefit duration. Realization of this 
problem lead to some studies that assumed that the underlying 
distribution of jobless spells is normal, and as a result assumed 
that the distribution of u in equation (2) is truncated normal. 
For example, Newton and Rosen {1979) and Classen (1979) both used 
Tobit analysis which assumes that u has the truncated normal 
distribution to correct for the truncation of the dependent 
variable. Newton and Rosen's results suggest that an additional 
week of potential benefit duration leads to 0.4 to 0.5 additional 
weeks of insured unemployment, whereas Classen's estimates suggest 
at most an additional 0.1 weeks.
The second reason for questioning the assumption that u in 
equation <2) is normal is that the empirical frequency 
distribution of weeks of insured unemployment in most data is not 
bell-shaped, as the normality assumption requires. Rather, it 
shows one spike at zero weeks of unemployment, and falling 
frequencies for greater unemployment durations, until a spike 
appears where censoring occurs (that is, at maximum benefit
17
duration.) Except for the spike at the censoring point, the 
empirical distribution looks much like an inverse exponential. 
This latter problem can be solved in a jobless-duration equation 
like (2) by making a more appropriate assumption about the 
distribution of u, and estimating equation (2) under that 
alternative distributional assumption. The Weibull distribution 
has been widely assumed in studies of jobless duration because it 
provides an approximation to the empirical distribution of jobless 
duration that appears to be valid (Lancaster 1979). (The 
exponential distribution is a special case of the Weibull. 
Whereas the exponential restricts -the conditional probability that 
a UI recipient will become reemployed (P. or the hazard rate) to 
be constant over -the spell of unemployment, the Weibull allows for 
the possibility that a UI recipient's probability of reemployment 
rises or falls over the spell. The greater generality of the 
Weibull distribution makes it "the preferred choice. )
Several studies have imposed a more appropriate
distributional assumption on u in equation (2), although few of 
these have examined the effects of potential benefit duration on 
the length of unemployment spells. Among the few that do, Solon 
(1985) has estimated that an additional week of potential benefit 
duration leads to 0.3 additional weeks of insured unemployment.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 display the results of 
estimating equation (2) under the assumption that the disturbance 
term u has the Weibull distribution. The interpretation of the 
Weibull model's coefficients is straightforward: Each coefficient 
gives the approximate proportional change in unemployment duration
18
that is attributable to a unit change in the explanatory 
variable.
The two Weibull models differ in the way that censored 
observations are defined. In the model displayed in column <3), 
the usual censoring assumptions are made all observations that 
are at the maximum potential benefit duration are defined as 
censored, and all other observations are taken to reflect actual 
weeks of joblessness. As discussed in section II.B, this is a 
misspecification of censoring, and column (3) is labeled 
accordingly. In the model displayed in column <4), I took 
advantage of the additional information on subsequent employment 
available in the Illinois data. This additional information 
allowed me to correct the misclassification of some completed 
spells of unemployment as censored (and vice versa), and column 
(4) is accordingly labeled "Corrected Censoring."
The main difference between the estimates resulting from the 
two Weibull models is in the estimated effect of FSC on the 
expected duration of joblessness. This should not be surprising, 
because the effect of FSC might well be concentrated on workers 
who have long spells of joblessness. These are precisely the 
workers about whom we are making crucial assumptions regarding 
whether a spell of joblessness is complete or censored. From the 
model of column (3), we can infer that the availability of FSC 
tends to reduce the expected duration of joblessness. This
6. The exact proportional change in duration attributable to a 
unit change in an explanatory variable is [exp(b ) - i]/shape, 
where shape is the Weibull shape parameter. If b, is small, and 
if the shape parameter is close to unity, then this expression 
approximately equals b, .
19
inference should not be taken seriously because there is good 
reason to believe that in this model, some completed spells have 
been treated as censored and vice versa.
Censoring has been more accurately specified in the Weibull 
model of column (4), and greater credence can probably be given "bo
the finding that FSC tends to increase the expected duration of
7 joblessness by nearly 5 weeks. This positive relationship
!
between FSC and jobless duration is also more plausible 
theoretically, and in keeping with earlier findings.
Hence, the evidence to this point suggest that accounting for 
censoring of the dependent variable and non-normality of the error 
term yields estimates of the effects of FSC that exceed estimates 
derived from simpler techniques that ignore these problems. Also, 
the evidence suggests that the approach to censoring taken in 
earlier research tends to yield lower estimates of the effects of 
extended benefits than does the corrected method permitted by the 
Illinois data.
C. Semi-Parametric Hazard Models
Two problems cannot be handled in either of the duration 
models discussed to this point. The first is that some variables 
may change during a worker's spell of joblessness. For example,
7. The proportional effect of FSC is found by exponentiating 
the coefficient of FSC (0.18), subtracting 1, and dividing by the 
Weibull shape parameter (0.813). This yields a 24 percent 
increase in duration attributable to FSC. Multiplying 0.24 by the 
sample mean weeks of observed unemployment (19.75) yields a 4.8 
week increase in duration attributable to FSC.
20
the number of weeks since the initial claim for UI benefits can be 
thought of as a variable that increases weekly. There is no way 
of understanding the effects of such "time-varying" explanatory 
variables in a duration model.
The second is that the duration models force us to make an 
assumption about the distribution of the error term u in equation
<2), and incorrect distributional assumptions will yield
t 
misleading inferences about the effects of FSC. For example, the
Weibull seems a good approximation to the empirical distribution 
of jobless spells as long as it is true that the spike in the 
empirical distribution in the week following benefit exhaustion 
results from censored data. But if the distribution of jobless 
spells shows a true spike in the week following benefit 
exhaustion that is, if workers tend to put off finding taking a 
job until just after their benfits terminate then the Weibull is 
a poor choice. Ideally, one would like to impose no 
distributional assumption at all.
To analyze the effects of time-varying explanatory variables 
and to avoid any assumptions about the distribution of jobless 
spells requires reconceptualizing the duration problem as a 
problem of rate of escape from joblessness. In other words, 
rather than regress some measure of duration on various
explanatory variables, one could regress a dummy variable <R. )t/
equal to one if a worker escaped from unemployment in week t (zero 
otherwise) on various explanatory variables, some of which are 
time-invariant <x^ f . .., X LT)/ and others which are time-varying 
<z 1 (t),   ., zw (t>). Since the dependent variable is a measure of
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a worker's probability of escaping joblessness in week t (given 
that the worker was "at risk" of escaping joblessness at the 
beginning of the week), it is appropriate to interpret the 
dependent variable as a hazard rate (as discussed above), and to 
call it h(t). Hence, this model can be written: 
<3) Rt = h<t) = b0 + b^ -I- ... -f bKx K +
c1 z 1 <t) + ... + cN zN (,t) + e.
i
If e is assumed normally distributed, then we have a linear
probability model, which is used in the exploratory work reported
p 
presently.
Each coefficient in equation (3) represents the change in the 
probability of reemployment -that results from a unit change in the 
independent variable. For example, if x. were age in years, then 
b* would show the change in probability of reemployment associated 
with an additional year of age. This change in probability would 
be assumed constant over the spell of unemployment (unless age 
were interacted with a time-varying explanatory variable). Note 
that a positive coefficient indicates a higher probability of 
returning to employment, and hence a shorter duration of 
unemployment.
Whereas the unit of observation in the various duration 
models represented by equation (2) and displayed in Table 3 is the
8. If e is assumed to have the logistic distribution, then we 
have a logit model, which is prefered to a linear probability 
model because it yields unbiased, consistent, and efficient 
coefficient estimates. Exploratory work estimating equation (3) 
by logit has yielded results that are nearly identical in terms 
of both statistical significance and quantitative response to 
variation in explanatory variables to the linear probability 
estimates reported below.
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claimant/ "the unit> of observation in a hazard model is the 
claimant-week. The transformation of claimant records into 
claimant-week records is illustrated in Table 4. Panel A shows 
records for three claimants, who experienced 4, 38, and 0 weeks of 
insured unemployment. The first and third claimant became 
reemployed after receiving their last UI benefit payment, whereas 
the second remained jobless. Also, the first and third were 
ineligible for FCS, whereas the second was eligible.
The second panel of Table 4 shows the claimant-week records 
that are generated by the three claimant records in Panel A. The 
first claimant contributes a total of 6 observations to the 
claimant-week data set one for the waiting week, one for each 
week in which UI benefits were received, and one more for the week 
following the spell of insured unemployment, since this worker 
became reemployed. The dependent variable in the hazard analysis, 
reemployment, is zero in all weeks except the last, in which 
reemployment occured. The second claimant contributes 39 
observations to the claimant week data set one for the waiting 
week, and one for each week in which UI benefits were received. 
The reemployment variable is zero for all of these observations, 
and since this claimant did not find reemployment after exhausting 
his UI benefits, there is no fortieth observation following the 
spell of insured unemployment in which the reemployment variable 
equals one. Note that, when claimant records are transformed into 
claimant-week records, each claimant contributes exactly as much 
information as is known about him to the analysis of reemployment 
probability (Allison 1982).
Hazard models such as <3) start from the pioneering work of 
Cox (1972), and are often referred to as "semiparametric" because 
they implicitly make no assumption about the distribution of u in 
the duration equation (2). Several recent studies (for example, 
Moffitt 1985a, 1985b; Steinberg and Monforte 1987; Sheffrin and 
Dynarski 1987; Ham and Rea 1987) have estimated hazard models such
as (3). Not all such studies have estimated the effects of
i 
increases in potential benefit duration on jobless duration:
Moffitt's estimates suggest that a one-week addition to potential 
duration leads to a 0.15-week increase in joblessness.
The estimates displayed in Table 5 are from two possible 
specifications of equation <3). Specifically, we regress R. On 
the same time-invariant individual characteristics as in the 
duration models, and add a set of dummy variables modeling the 
time since the initial claim (t., t«, ..., ^N )s 
<4) Rt = h<t) = bQ + b1 x 1 -I- ... + bKx K +
cl*l * C2t> 2 +  " + 0N*N + U< 
The time-since-initial-claim dummy variables (t., ..., t ) can be
thought of time-varying explanatory variables, since their values 
change as a claimant's time since filing for benefits lengthens. 
Note that the use of dummy variables allows estimation of a 
completely flexible relationship between the hazard rate and the 
time since filing the initial claim. No assumption is imposed on 
the shape of the hazard function.
A negative coefficient in the reemployraent hazard model 
implies a lower probability of reemployment in any given week, and 
hence a longer expected unemployment duration. Thus, we expect
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variables with positive coefficients in the duration models to 
have negative coefficients in the Reemployment Hazard model. A 
comparison of the results in Table 5 with columns (3) and (4) in 
Table 3 shows that this is usually the case.
It is convenient to show graphically how the conditional 
probability of reemployment changes with the time since filing the 
initial claim, as in Figure 1. The reemployment hazards under
i
misspecified censoring are shown as squares, whereas the hazards
gunder corrected censoring are shown as plus signs. Both hazard 
plots are surprisingly flat, and the differences between the two 
are not great except near the expiration points, which are 27 and 
39 weeks after filing for benefits. That the hazards should 
differ at these points is important, however, because at these 
points erroneous assumptions are made under usual censoring 
conventions.
The results of main interest in Table 5 pertain to the 
effects of FSC. When censoring is misspecified as in column (1) 
 it appears that the availability of FSC has no impact on the 
probability if returning to work. But under corrected censoring  
in column <2) the estimated impact of FSC availability on the 
probability of returning to work is large. The coefficient <- 
0.012) implies that jobless workers who were eligible to receive 
FSC were 1.2 percentage points less likely to return to work in 
any given week than were ineligible workers.
9. The reemployment hazard rates are computed by substituting 
the characteristics of the average worker in each week into the 
hazard function, and solving for the dependent variable.
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This 1.2 percentage point decrease in the reemployment 
probability needs to be viewed in context. The average weekly 
hazard that is, the average probability of returning to work in 
any given week was 0.035 or 3.5 percent for the average worker 
who was ineligible to receive FSC. 10 The availability of FSC 
lowered this probability to 0.023 (= 0.035 - 0.012), or 2.3
percent. This is a decrease in the probability of finding
i 
reemployment of about 33 percent, and suggests that FSC
availability sharply reduced incentives to find reemployment.
An important limitation of, the model specified as equation 
(3) is that it restricts the effect of FSC availability to be 
constant over the jobless spell. If FSC had an impact on the 
reemployment hazard rate that varied over the jobless spell, then 
this constant-proportion restriction would be undesirable.
It is straightforward to relax the constant-proportion 
restriction. Rather than enter eligibility for FSC as a single 
time-invariant dummy variable, FSC-eligibility can be interacted 
with the time-since-initial-claim variables to yield additional 
terms (t^SC, t2FSC, ..., t-j-FSC) . These new interaction terms 
are then added to the model:
10. This so-called baseline hazard is computed by substituting 
the sample means into the estimated hazard function and solving 
for the dependent variable.
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(5) Rt = h<t) = bQ + b 1 x 1 + ... + bK * K +
cl*l +  2t2 + ''' + CN*N +
d1 (t 1 FSC) -I- d z (t 2FSC) + ... + dN_ 1 (tN _ 1 FSC) + u. 11
The d, coefficients will represent the change in the reemployment \f
hazard in period t that is induced by the availability if FSC.
Table 6 and Figure 2 display the central results of 
estimating a model based on equation (5). Column (2) of Table 6, 
headed "FSC-Induced Change in Hazard," displays the coefficients 
of the interaction terms (d- f d«, .../ d., . ), which again can be 
interpreted as the time-dependent change in reemployment hazard 
induced by FSC-eligibility. <The estimated coefficients come from 
a model identical to that displayed in column <2) of Table 5, with 
the addition of terms that interact FSC-eligibility with time- 
since-initial-claim. ) The results suggest that FSC reduces the 
probability of reemployment late in the regular benefit spell 
(that is, in weeks 22, 23, and 26), and dramatically reduces the 
reemployment probability at the regular UI exhaustion point (week 
27), and in the weeks during which FSC is received (weeks 28 
through 35).
Figure 2 shows the reemployment hazard plots (that is, the 
conditional probabilities of reemployraent over the spell of
joblessness) for workers who are eligible for FSC and for those
12 
who are not. The figure throws light on two points. First,
the pattern the reemployment hazard for FSC-eligible workers
11. Note that the Nth interaction term Is omitted in order to 
avoid perfect multicolinearity.
12. As in Figure, these reemployment hazard rates are computed 
for the average worker who remains jobless in each week.
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suggests that restricting the effect of FSC to be constant in all 
periods is highly misleading. Second, and more important, the 
figure illustrates the dramatic reduction in the reemployment 
hazard among FSC-eligible claimants at the time regular benefits 
expire (27 week after the initial claim). Indeed, the change in 
the reemployment probability induced by FSC in week 27 can only be
described as astonishing: Claimants who exhausted their regular
I benefits and were ineligible for an additional 12 weeks of FSC had
a probability of finding reemployment of 0.81; whereas claimants 
who exhausted their regular benefits but were eligible for FSC had 
a probability of reemployment of 0.13.
What are the implications for jobless duration of the 
findings displayed in Table 6 and Figure 2? It is a 
straightforward exercise to compute expected jobless duration from 
a complete hazard function (Ham and Rea 1987). Denote the 
reemployment hazard in week t as h(t). This is the probability of 
finding reemployment in week t, conditional on having experienced 
t-1 weeks of joblessness. It follows that the unconditional 
probability of experiencing t weeks of joblessness is:
p(t) = Cl-h(0)3Cl-h(l)3Cl-h(2)3 ... [l-h<t-l)3[h(t)3. 
That is, p(t) is the probability of not finding a job in the first 
t-1 weeks (the product of the conditional probabilities of not 
finding a job in each of the first t-1 weeks) times the 
conditional probability of finding a job in week t [h<t)3- The 
expected jobless duration is then found as:
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oo
E<D) = I t[p<t)3.
t=l 
Carrying out t-his exercize suggests that the expected jobless
duration of the sample mean worker would have been 40.3 weeks if 
he had been eligible for FSC, and 29.2 weeks if he had been 
ineligible for FSC. The difference, 11.1 weeks, is the implied 
effect of FSC on expected jobless duration. The result can be
stated another way: Each week of FSC availability increased the
i 
expected duration of joblessness by over 0.9 week.
This result suggests that the effects of an additional 
potential week of UI benefits are significantly larger than most 
previous estimates have indicated. It is unclear whether the 
magnitude of the result obtained here should be attributed to one 
of more factors that are particular to these data for example, to 
the fact that in these data FSC eligibility is uncorrelated with 
work history, or to the arguably improved specification of 
censoring that these data allow, or perhaps to peculiarities of 
the FSC program around the time it expired.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has explored the effects of extended unemployment 
benefits specifically the Federal Supplemental Compensation 
program that existed from 1982 to 1984 on the length of 
unemployed workers' jobless spells. The data used come from the 
administrative records of the Illinois Department of Employment 
Security, and are especially well suited to such an inquiry for at 
least two reasons. First, because the data span the expiration of
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the FSC program at the end of 1984, they permit one to compare the 
jobless spells of workers who were actually eligible to FSC with 
the spells of workers who would have been eligible if they had 
become unemployed and filed for benefits a matter of weeks 
earlier. This differs from other available data sets, in which 
eligibility for extended benefits is not independent of individual 
characteristics such as base period earnings or weeks of 
employment prior to layoff. Hence, the Illinois data permit 
cleaner comparisions than data used in earlier studies, and we 
might expect more striking results.
Second, the Illinois data include earnings history data, 
which permit one to correctly classify spells of unemployment/ as 
complete or censored. Earlier researchers have freqently had "bo 
make what appear to be erroneous assumptions about whether a spell 
of insured unemployment represents a complete or censored spell of 
joblessness.
These data yield striking findings about the effects of FSC 
on the expected length of a jobless spell. A Weibull model of the 
duration of joblessness suggests that the availability of FSC 
increased the expected duration of a worker's jobless spell by 
nearly 5 weeks. The result can be stated another way: Each week 
of extended benefits increased the expected duration of 
joblessness by 0.4 weeks <= 4.8/12). This estimate is toward the 
upper end of the range of existing estimates of the effects of 
extended benefits on jobless duration.
A hazard model of the conditional probability of becoming 
reemployed yields a yet higher estimate of the influence of
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extended benefits on jobless duration. FSC eligibility 
dramatically lowered the probability of returning to employment 
around the time of benefit exhaustion and during actual receipt of 
FCS (Table 6 and Figure 3). It follows that FSC increased the 
expected length of unemployed workers' jobless spells by over 11 
weeks. Stated another way, an additional week of potential
benefits increased the expected duration of joblessness by nearly
I 
one week. The finding suggests that the effects of an additional
potential week of UI benefits are significantly larger than most 
previous estimates have indicated.
Perhaps the most striking finding revealed in this work 
pertains to the effect that the availability of 12 weeks of 
extended benefits has on workers' probability of finding a job at 
 the expiration of their 26 weeks of regular benefits. Claimants 
who exhausted their regular benefits and were ineligible for an 
additional 12 weeks of FSC had a probability of finding 
reemployment of 0.81; whereas claimants who exhausted their 
regular benefits but were eligible for FSC had a probability of 
reemployment of just 0.13. Hence, the results strongly suggest 
that workers tend to find jobs just as their UI benefits expire.
Two conclusions seem appropriate in view of the findings 
presented. First, it seems likely that previous research has had 
to make do with data that are rather poorly suited to estimating 
the effect of potential benefit duration on jobless duration. For 
example, in most data, variation in the potential duration of UI 
benefits is correlated with other factors such as earnings 
history. Also, many studies have been forced to make incorrect
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assumptions about which spells of unemployment- were censored and 
which were complete. Either factor correlation between potential 
benefit duration and worker characteristics or misspecified 
censoring could lead to estimates of the effects of extended 
benefits on expected jobless duration that are downward biased. 
Accordingly, the results obtained here suggest that we might begin 
to revise upward our estimates of how much an additional week of 
benefit availability increases jobless spells.
The second conclusion is somewhat more negative: In order to 
obtain a convincing point estimate of the effects of extended 
benefit/s on jobless duration, it may well be necessary to conduct 
household surveys that follow-up known spells of insured 
unemployment so t/hat completed spells of joblessness beyond the 
maximum duration of benefits can be observed. That is, 
administrative data have been pushed about as far as they can in 
this endeavor, and additional (very costly) data will be needed to 
advance our knowledge any further.
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Table 1
Classification of Workers by Weeks of
UI Benefits Claimed and 
Subsequent Labor Force Status
Number of Observed
Number of Weeks of Labor Force Status Men in Illinois 





Out of Covered Employment
D
Fewer than Potential In Covered Employment





Notes; Cases B and C are correctly characterized by usual censoring 
conventions; Cases A and D are misspecified by the usual conventions.
Table 2
Mean Insured Unemployment Durations for Men
by Monetary and Temporal Eligibility for
Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC)
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Temporal
Eligibility Monetary Eligibility for FSC
for FSC Eligible Ineligible
21.387 16.532
Eligible (0.402) (1.144)
(N  = 1131) (N - 79)
17.864 20.058
Ineligible (0.318) (0.957)
(N - 866) (N - 86)
Difference 3.524 -3.527
(0.513) (1.979)
Notes: In order to be monetarily eligible for FSC, a claimant needed 
have total base period earnings equal to at least 1.5 times earnings 
high-earnings quarter of the base period. To be Temporally Eligible 
FSC, a claimant needed to file an initial claim for UI benefits befor 
September 30, 1984. Insured unemployment duration refers to the tota 
number of weeks of benefits (both state regular and FSC) received in 
claimant's full benefit year.
Table 3
Alternative Models of Unemployment Duration 



























































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low UE, 0.080 -0.890 -0.120 0.040 
Stable Growth (0.271) (0.968) (0.086) (0.089)
Chicago (Average 
































































Weibull Shape -- -- 0.871 0.813
Parameter (0.020) (0.020)
R-squared (adj) -- 0.078
F -- 9.339
Loglikelihood -- -- -2,893 -2,683
Table 3 
(continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of
Censored -- -- 717 839
Observations
Total Sample
Size -- 2,162 2,162 2,162
Notes: The dependent variable in column (2) is the number of weeks of 
UI compensated unemployment experienced during the benefit year. Mean 
of the dependent variable is 19.75 weeks. The Weibull models account 
for censoring of the dependent variable, imposing the assumption that 
the underlying distribution of unemployment spells is well-described by 
the Weibull distribution. See the text for a discussion.
Table 4
Transformation of Data on Claimants into 
Data on Claimant-Weeks








































































































Notes: The claimant is the unit of observation in the alternative 
models of unemployment duration in Table 3 (Panel A). The claimant- 
week is the unit of observation in the reemployment hazard models in 
Table 5 (Panel B).
J/ -1
Table 5
Reemployment Hazard Models 

















































































































































































Censored Spells 717 839
Total Number
of Spells 2,162 2,162
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
reemployment occured in week t, zero otherwise. The unit of 
observation is the claimant-week (rather than the individual 
claimant), and there are 47,014 claimant-week observations. See 
equation 3 in the text, and the accompanying discussion.
TABLE 6
Change in the Reemployment Hazard
Induced by Eligibility for FSC
by Time Since Initial Claim
(1)







































































Notes: Figures displayed in column (2) are coefficients from a 
hazard model similar to that in column (2) of Table 5, with the 
addition of variables interacting FSC eligibility with time since 
initial claim.
One asterisk (*) denotes rejection of the hypothesis that 
the FSC-induced change in reemployment hazard is zero at the 5- 
percent level of confidence; two asterisks (**) denotes rejection 
of the hypothesis that the FSC-induced change in reemployment 
hazard is zero at the 1-percent level of confidence.
Figure 1
Reemployment Hazard Rates for Men Under 
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